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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

)
BRIEF

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

vs.

)

MICHAEL JOHNSON,

)

Case No. 16840

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>
I.
,

NATURE OF THE CASE
The

defendant~appellant

was convicted in the Circuit

Court for public intoxication in violation of Section 32-1-4
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake Citv, 1965.
II.

DISPOSITION IN.LOWER COURT
The'appellant-Johnson pleaded guilty in the Circuit
Court to the offense of public intoxication and was fined
the sum of $15.

The Circuit Court denied the appellant-

Johnsol"'s Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Section 32-1-4
Revieed Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965 as amended,
was not unconstitutionally vaque.

On appeal, the District

Court upheld both the conviction of the appellant and the
constitutionality of the City's public intoxication
ordinance.
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III.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent Salt Lake City seeks to have the
conviction of the appellant-Johnson uoheld and the ruling of
the District Court, that Section 32-1-4 Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965 as amended, is constitutional,
affirmed.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On December 26, 1978,the City

fil~d

a criminal

complaint against the appellant-Johnson in the Circuit Court
for being intoxicated in a public place in violation of
Section 32-1-4 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah
1965 as amended.
2.

(R-4).

On January 9, 1979 the appellant-Johnson filed a

Motion to Dismiss alleginq that said ordinance was
unconstitutionally vaquP..
3.

(R-55, 56).

The Circuit Court entered an Order on May 3, 1979

denyinq the appellant-Johnson's Motion and upheld the.
constitutionality of the ordinance.
4.

(R-62).

On the 14th day of May 1979 counsel for the

appellant, Mr. Brian Barnard, pleaded the appellant-Johnson
guilty to the charge of being intoxicated in a public
place.
5.

(R-3, 6).
Thereafter the appellant-Johnson appealed his
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conviction to the Third Judicial District Court.

After oral

argument, submission of evidence and hearing on the matter,
the Court upheld the conviction of the appellant-Johnson and
the constitutionality of the ordinance.

The Court's

judoment was entered -on the 21st day of December, 1979.

(R-

9, 10, 49, 50).

6.
Appeal.
7.

The appellant-Johnson thereafter filed a Notice of
( R-50).
The appellant has--not raised any disputed issues of
•,

fact regarding the
as applied.

constituti~nality--of

the City's ordinance

The sole issue raised· by the appellant is

whether the oroinance is constitutional on its face.

v.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CITY ORDINANCES-ARE PRESUMED TO BE VALID
AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THF. CONSTITUTION1
THE BURDEN OF CHALLENGING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A CITY ORDINANCE
LIES ON THE CHALLENGER
T~e

City ordinance in question, Section 32-1-4 of the

Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, provides:
"Drinking and drunkenness in public places.
No persons shall drink li~uor in a public
building, park or stadium or be in an
intoxicated condition in a public place."
(See Appendix "A").
The defendant has conceded the constitutionality.of the
first part of this ordinance that "no person shall drink
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liquor in a public building, park or stadium • • ·" and
contends only that the term "intoxicated condition" is vague
and therefore unconstitutional.
It should first be noted that statutes and ordinances
are presumed to be constitutional and every reasonable
presumption will be afforded to render them valid.

It is

the burden of the person challenging the statute to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the law is constitutionally
defective, Salt Lake City v. Savaqe, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah,
I

1~75)

Cert. denied 425 U.S.

91~

(1976).

The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue as
follows:
"It is well settled in this state, as
elsewhere, that the courts will not declare a
statute unconstitutional unless it clearly
and manifestly violates some provision of the
constitution of the United.States. Every
presumption must be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of an act, and every
reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its
validity.
(citations omitted) The whole
burden lies on him who denies the
constitutionality of a legislative
enactment." State v. Packer, 297 P. 1013,
1016 (Utah, 1931). See also, State v.
Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah, 1952).
(Emphasis added).
It should also be noted that Section 32-7-13 Utah Code
Annotated, (1953) reads verbatim, and is identical, to the
City's public intoxication ordinance.

Therefore the

decision of this Court will affect not only the validity of
the subject ordinance, but the state law as well.
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The

state's public intoxication statute cited above was
collaterally upheld and cited with approval by the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Bryan, 395 P.2d 539 (Utah, 1964).
In the case of State·v. Packard, supra, the Utah
Supreme Court.held:
"It is recoqnized that statutes should·not be
declared unconstitutional if there is any
reasonable basis upon which theymay be
sustained as falling within the
constitutional framework [citations omitted],
and that a statute will not be held void for
uncertainty if-any sort·of·sensible,
practical effect may·'be given it." Id. at
563.
•,
The Supreme Court of the ·United States has repeatedly
ruled that:

n• •• - .[T]he Constitution doe~ not require
impossible standards'1 all that is required
is that the lanquaqe 'conveys· sufficiently
definite warninq as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by com:nion unt:Ierstandinq and ·
practices • • • '" Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 491 (1956).
(Emphasis added).
The United'··States Supreme Court has held that municipal
ordinances-and<state·statutes will only be·held
unconstitutional if they "fail to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute."
U.S.

612~

u.s.

156 (1972).

United States ·v. Harris, 347

617 (1953), cf. Papachristou v.· Jacksonville, 405

In discussing the principles of statutory construction,
the Supreme Court in Harris, supra stated:

-s-
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"The underlyinq principle is that no man
shall be held criminally responsible for
conduct which he couln not reasonably
understand to be proscribed.
"On the other hand, if the oeneral class of
offenses to which the statute is directed in
plainly within its terms, the statute will
not be struck down as vague, even though
marqinal cases could be put where doubt might
arise.
[citations omitted].
Id at 617, 618.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held:

"A statute is vague [only] when it fails to
inform persons of ordinary intelligence what
their conduct must be in order for them to be
guilty of a violation thereof." State v.
Haiq, 578 P. 2d 837, 839' ,(Utah, 1978).
__......_
This latter principle of constitutional law has been
readily cited by the appellant-Johnson.

However, what the

appellant has failed to do is point out that public
intoxication ordinances and statutes like those in question
have been universally upheld by the courts of this country
against all

constitutiona~ challen~es.

In fact, the appellant has failed to cite any specific
precedent or direct legal authority whatsoever in support of
his argument that the City's public intoxication ordinance
should be declared unconstitutional.

The defendant has

preferred only general principles of law and unsound
hypotheticals as authority for his argument and has, thus,
failed to sustain the burden of constitutional challenge.
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POINT II
SECTION 32-1-4 REVISED ORDINANCRS OF SALT
LAKE CITY, UTAH 1965, IS CONSTITUTIONAL
IN ALL REGARDS AND IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ''AGUE.
Drunkenness and intoxication in public places are
unquestionably matters for municipal regulation.

Ordinances

dealinq·with suchMbear a manifest relationship to the public
peace; health, safety and morals of the community, and the
cases that so hold are legion.
P.2d 692 (Wash., 1967).

See, Seattle v. Hill, 435

-,

Ordinances prohibiting and penalizing public
intoxication have been universally sustained against
constitutional ..-challenges such as the one being made by the
defendant herein.

See Quittner v. Thompson, 309 F.Supp. 684

(1970): Goldstein v. Atlanta, 234 S.E.2d 344 (Georgia,
'

1977): Ex Parte Boza, 106 P.2d 29 (Cal., 1940): Seattle v.
Hill, supra: Findlay v. City of Tulsa, 561 P.2d 980 (Okla.,
1977).
In Findlay, supra, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals rejected the same vagueness argument that the
appellant herein is raising.

The court in reiectinq the

defendant's argument stated:
"Only reasonable certainty is required and it
is elementary that the prohibited act may be
characterized by a general term without ·
definition- if that term has a settled and
commonly understood meaning which does not
leave a person of ordinary intelliqence in
doubt.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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* * *
"The condition of being in a state of
intoxication is a matter of qeneral
knowledge, the meaning of which is
sufficientlv 'settled and commonly
understood' so that definite and sensible
definition may be made of the words of the
ordinance in question." Id. at 983, 984.
(Emphasis added).
The Court in Findlay held that the terms "intoxicated"
and "drunk" were synonymous and stated the commonly accepted
meaning of the terms to be:
"A person is drunk in a.)egal sense wh~n he
is so far under the influence of liquor that
his passions are viiibly ~xcited or his
judgment impaired by the liquor • • • " Id.
at 688.
The Findlay Court concluded by holdinq:
"Therefore it is the opinion of this court
that since the prohibition aqainst public
intoxication is well defined and well within
the province of the state br municipality to
requlate, the defendant's assertion that the
ordinance in question is vaque and overbroad
is found to be without merit." Id. at 984.
(Emphasis added).
In Ouittner v. Thompson, supra, the Federal District
Court of Florida held the term "drunk or intoxicated" in a
municipal ordinance was not vaque.

After citinq the Supreme

Court standard to he applied in vagueness challenges the
court held:
"This court finds, • • • that the phrase
'drunk or intoxicated' is constitutionallv
sufficient." Id. at 686.
(Emphasis adaed).
In Ex Parte Boza, 106 P.2d 29 (Cal., 1940) the
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California Court of Appeals rejected the vaqueness argument
presented by the defendant and held:
"The ordinance does provide a punishment for
those who become intoxicated within the
, meaninq of that term in....a public pl.ace or a
·>;.,place open to public view. We see little
, merit to petitioner's argument in this
respect. The constitutionality of the
ordinance is not subiect to attack upon the
grounds stated [i.e., vagueness]."
Id. at
32.
(Emphasis added).
The courts have qenerally held that terms "intoxicated"
and "drunk" to be synonymous.

Black's Law·Dictionary (4th

Ed.) citing a weal th of authorities,. d·ef ines "drunk" as
follows:
"A person is 'drunk' when he is so far under
the influence of liquor that his passions are
visibly excited or his iudqment impaired, or
when his brain is so far affected by
potations of liquor that his intelligence,
sense-perceptions, judgment, continuity of
thought or of ideas, speech, and coordination of volition with muscular action
(or some of these faculties or processes) are
impaired or not under normal control • • • •
It [drunk] is a synonym of intoxicated."
(Emphasis added).
In State v. Painter, 134 S.E.2d 628 (N.C., 1964) the
North Carolina Supreme Court defined the terms "drunk" and
"intoxicated" as follows:
"The word 'drunk' is a synonym for the word
'intoxicated.' And a person is 'drunk' or
'intoxicated' when he is so far under the
influence of intoxicatinq liquor that his
passions are visibly excited or his judgment
materially impaired, or when his brain is so
far affected by potations of intoxicating
liquor that his intelligence, sense·
perceptions, judqment, continuity of thought
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or of ideas, speech and coordination of
volition with muscular action, or some of
these faculties or processes are materially
impaired.
In our opinion, this is the
definition of 'drunk' or 'intoxicated'
recoqnized 'in common speech, in ordinary
experience, and, in iudicial decisions.'"
The appellant has erroneously argued.that the
consumption of alcohol no matter how small or from what
source is sufficient to make a person subject to the
provisions of the ordinance in question.
case.

Such is not the

Individuals are free to consume alcohol and then
•,

appear in public

place~ withou~

they are not intoxicated.

fear of arrest as long as

It is only when a person has

consumed alcohol to the point that he or she becomes so
under the influence of alcohol as to be "intoxicated" or
"drunk" that a person is. subject to. the provisions Qf __the
City's ordinance.
This same position was adopted by the Court in Quittner
v. Thompson, supra:
"It is clear that the pertinent languaqe of
Section 20-10 of the Dania Municipal Code,
wh~n measured by common understanding,
conveys a sufficient and definite warning as
to what conduct is prohibited by its terms;
i.e., citizens within the municipality, while
free to inqest intoxicating liquors, may not
drink to the point where the influence of the
liquor deprives them of the possession of
their normal facilities."
Id. at 686.
The responsibility for making the determination of who
is intoxicated is rightfully left to a police officer's
judqment, based upon probable cause.

A police officer is as
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entitled to rely upon his own judgment, experience, and
knowledge in determining whether a person should be arrested
for being intoxicated in public, as are members of a jury in
decidinq such a case in a judicial proceerlinq.
The appellant has pr·oferred several e){amples as to how
the City's ordinance could be amended so as to meet
constitutional criteria.

In these examples, the appellant

allegedly sets forth "·objective criteria" which he feels are
otherwise lacking in the current City ordinance.

Upon

examination, however, the profe~red guidelines still require
a

po~ice

officer to use his own judgment in determining

whether probable cause exists to make an arrest for public
intoxication.
A police· officer must still make a determination of
whether a ;person is under the influence so as to be "unable
to exercise care for his safety or the safety of others" or
whether a person is a "danger to himself or a danqer to
others".

Appellant Brief pp. 14, 15.

These proffered

criteria would still require the same type of judqments
based upon the arresting officer's experience, knowledge and
view of the circumstances.
The appellant's fears of harrassment by a police
offic~r due to the provisions of the City's public

intoxication ordinance are without merit.

This Court in

upholding the validity of the City's vagrancy ordinance
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stated:
"We are unable to see where any unusual
authority is given to police officers or to
prosecuting attorneys by this ordinance.
In
every criminal case a determination must be
made as to whether a crime has been committed
and whether the evidence is sufficient to
obtain a conviction.
If those charged with
the duty of enforcing the law are not doing
their duty, a qrand jurv can be called.
If
they are overly zealous in making an arrest
of a defendant, the trial jury will so say,
and the defendant will then have his civil
remedies available to him.
These matters
apply alike to this orninance as well as to
any other crime." Savaqe, supra, 1036-1037.
The ordinance in question.simply does not allow for
official misconduct as did the vagrancy statute which was
struck down by the United States Supreme Court and
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
Papachristou is cited by the appellant for the proposition
that those who suffer from vague ordinances are the poor,
idelers, and dissenters of society.
It is submitted that there has been absolutely no
allegation supported in fact or otherwise that the City's
public intoxication ordinance is or has been discriminarily
- - -- enforced against -the appellant-Johnson or any otherc:person
on any basis whatsoever.

The subject ordinance punishes

individuals for conduct, not for status, therefore, it is
- distinguishable from the vagrancy ordinance struck down in
Papachristou.
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~

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted for the foregoing reasons
that the appellant has failed to sustain his burden of
demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the City's public
intoxication ordinance.

The City maintains that its

ordinance is constitutional and virtually identical to the
other public intoxication ordinances that have been
universally upheld against the same constitutional arguments
made by the appellant in the present case.

The conviction

of the defendant should be up~eld and the District Court's
decision affirming the constitutionality of the City's
ordinance should be affirmed.
DATED

this~~~

day of April, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,

ROGER F. CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney

PAUL G. MAUGHAN
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Salt Lake City
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APPENDIX "A"

Sec. 32-1-4. Drinking and drunkenness in public
places. No person shall drink liquor in a public builoinq,
park or stadium or be in an intoxicated condition in a
public place.
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